the backdrop of the
pre-summit hype and back home would have been a tough act to explain. Musharraf
has been spared the predicament of defending another Tashkent.
From his point of view, and no doubt Pakistan`s, far better not to have a joint
declaration than to bring back a weak one. The glumness should therefore
lighten. The gods were favourable to us in Agra and it was Pakistan which
basked in the limelight. Never in recent times was
the word Kashmir mentioned as much on television or in newspapers in India as
during the summit. The joint declaration may have foundered on the need for a
mutually acceptable compromise. But for the army of journalists who had
gathered in Agra there was little doubt as to what the sticking point--call it
core issue or whatever-- had been. How does this not redound to Pakistan`s
advantage?
Musharraf himself, let`s
not deny him the credit, was the star attraction of the summit. He obviously
got on well with Mr Vajpayee, a circumstance behind the personal chemistry that
by all accounts the two leaders developed. He left no one in any doubt that
Kashmir topped the Pakistani agenda. And in his breakfast meeting with Indian
newspaper editors, by general consent he came across as impressive.
This event, recorded only
by PTV, was not meant for immediate telecast. But Prannoy Roy of New Delhi
Television (the organization which does news programming for Star News),
sensing the opportunity, persuaded Pakistani officials to lend him the only
copy of the recording. The result was a media coup for Star News and something
which dominated the Agra skyline for the
rest of the day. Liking not a bit of this, the Indian side later came out with
heavy hints that
when Musharraf started speaking through the media that was the time the Indian
government decided to dig in its heels and give him nothing with which to
return to Pakistan. But this was disinformation. The talks came to a dead-end
for other reasons and not because of Musharraf`s straight talking. How were the
talks scuppered? Quite simply because Vajpayee himself and
his cabinet hard-liners (led of course by Mr Advani) were operating on
different wavelengths. The hard-liners wanted to give nothing on Kashmir and
even though Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh twice agreed on the Kashmir clauses
of the draft joint declaration, on both occasions he, and his prime minister,
were vetoed by the hawks. Which, as it takes little imagination to see,
is not the best way of conducting any kind of negotiations. Where in the world
during high-level negotiations are the principals subject to constant
cross-checking and blocking by more influential figures in the wings? But
that`s what happened at Agra.
This circumstance alone
testifies to one of the inherent flaws in this summit. While Musharraf was
master of his show, and in a position to call the shots, Vajpayee, for all his
pre-eminence as a leader, found his hands tied by his BJP hard-liners. On
screen many Indian presenters kept asking the question: can Musharraf be
trusted? In the end, it was the Indian government, especially its Advani
hard-liners, which could not be trusted to sustain the momentum
generated by this visit. When the crunch came Vajpayee`s poetic vision was
helpless before the
cold-eyed narrowism of his hard-line colleagues. If he had his eyes on history,
Advani probably had his on the provincial elections which are to come in Uttar
Pradesh. That`s how Agra crumbled.
Pakistan
need shed no tears at this outcome. For the first time since Kargil the burden
of intransigence and provocation shifts clearly to Indian shoulders. During the
summit`s final hours Pakistani newsmen in mobile contact with members of the
Pakistan delegation sensed a growing feeling of anger and frustration at
India`s delaying tactics. Twice, it was said, Jaswant Singh had gone back on
his own draft. As rumour flew thick and fast, what had already
been an extraordinary summit showed every sign of turning into a screen
thriller. To add to the sense of drama came word at this point that General
Musharraf wanted to address Pakistani journalists but was being prevented from
doing so by the Indian side. The air quickly filled with a hint of raw
patriotism but the tension subsided with the news that Musharraf had left for
Agra airport. Was the Pakistani side expecting too much? If so, we were wrong
because we
were not negotiating from strength. What leverage did we have? Why should India
then have