Frank Moraes and Others v. T.V. Chokappa
The High Court of Madras
Crl. M.P. Nos. 2089, 2091 and 2093 of 1971
Media Involved: Newspaper
Decided On: 02.11.1971
A.S. VenkatachalaMoorthy, J.
1. The petitioners in these three petitions are the Editors and Publishers, respectively of three Dailies, viz., Dinamani, Indian Express and the Hindu, and they are facing a trial before the V Presidency Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, for defamation, in respect of certain publications made in their dailies on the 25th and 26th of January, 1971.
2. The proceedings started in the following circumstances: The DravidaKazhagam, of which Periyar E. V. Ramaswami is the leader, had organised a conference at Salem on the 23rd and 24th of January, 1971, under the name "Anti-superstition Conference", The object of this conference was for evolving means and methods for the eradication of superstitious beliefs and practices prevalent in the country. One Thiru, T. V. Chokkappa, who figures as the respondent in these three petitions, was elected as the Chairman of the Reception Committee. Several resolutions were passed in this conference and one resolution was to the effect that "if a married woman desires another man, it would not be made an offence". The object of this resolution was to achieve the complete emancipation of women and create and establish perfect equality in social life for them as it is now found in the foreign countries. The Tamil reading of the resolution was as below:--
The newspapers mentioned above published a news item on 25th January, 1971 and 26th January, 1971 under the caption "Demonstration against the Obscene Tableaux" and published the resolution as below;--
"The Conference passed a resolution requesting the Government to take suitable steps to see that coveting another man's wife is not made an offence under the Indian Penal Code."
Stating that the resolution was distorted and published in the above manner, deliberately and maliciously, with the avowed object of lowering down his reputation and the reputation of the other members of his party, the respondent filed three separate complaints against the Editor and publisher of the aforesaid newspapers in Court. Process was issued. The petitioners appeared. The complainant as P.W. 1 deposed that the resolution passed by them was meant to state that if a married woman desires another man, it should not be considered an offence in Society, and that the resolution as published in the aforesaid papers conveyed the impression to the mind of the readers as though they had requested the Government to legalise adultery, which was not the case and which was far from truth, he further deposed that this had the effect of lowering down his reputation in the mind of the general public. Gopalasamy (P.W. 4), an Assistant Engineer in the Highways Research Station at Madras, deposed that he was having regard for the members of the DravidaKazhagam as social reformers and that after reading the aforesaid resolution as published to the newspapers, he formed an impression that those members belonged to a low level, interested in creating an uncivilized Society where one man can take another man's wife. The learned Magistrate has framed charges under Secs. 500 and 501 against the petitioners. The petitioners now seek to quash these charges on the ground that the respondent-complainant is not a person aggrieved within the ambit of S. 198, Criminal Procedure Code, so as to come forward with a, complaint for defamation.
3. The petitioners in their affidavits, contend that the respondent has filed the complaints against them only in his capacity as the Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Anti-superstition Conference held at Salem that the impugned report does not make any reference individually to the complainant, that the letter's case is rested on alleged harm to the reputation of a class of persons of whom he is one and that in the absence of say specific reference or imputation concerning the complainant, he is not competent to maintain the complaints, because he is not a person aggrieved within the meaning of S. 198 of the Criminal procedure Code. The complainant has averred in his complaints, that he is one of the members responsible for sponsoring and piloting the said resolution, that several members of the public made enquiries about this resolution as published with grave concern and that the publication of such a dictated news has considerably lowered him and the other members of the party in the estimation of the public. This is what he has also deposed to in his evidence.
4. S. 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence falling under Chapter XIX or Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code or under Ss. 493 to 496 (both inclusive) of the same Code, except upon a complaint made by, some persons aggrieved by such a offence. S. 499 of the Indian Penal Code deals with defamation and it is an offence falling in Chapter XXI. Except upon a complaint made, by some person aggrieved by such offence, the Court cannot take cognizance of the said offence. Explanation II to S. 499 refers to defamation of a Company or an association or a collection of persons as such, and in such, cases one of their members make a complaint on behalf of the collection of company of persons as a whole. But, the defamation must be shown to be all purposes in the association or collection so much. In other words, if a well-defined class is defamed, each and every member of that class can file a complaint. What is necessary is that the libel complained of must have affected them all so that every individual could predicate of himself that the imputation was calculated to harm his own reputation as one member of that large body who had been made the libeler's target.
5. In Wahid UllahAnsary v. The Emperor, A.I.R. 1935 All. 743, the defamatory articles in newspaper described the girls in a particular college as persons habitually guilty of misbehavior. It was held that all the girls in the college collectively or each girl individually must suffer in reputation and as such a prosecution for defamation, instituted by some of the girls, was maintainable. In Sahib Singh Mehra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1965 S. C. 1451, defamatory remarks were published in a newspaper against the Public Prosecutors and Assistant Public Prosecutors of Uttar Pradesh. It was held that the language of Explanation II to S. 499 of the Indian Penal Code is general and that any collection of persons would be covered by it. It was pointed out that the collection of persons must be identifiable, in the sense that one could with certainty say that this group of particular people has been defamed as distinguished from the rest of the community. It was further observed that the prosecuting staff of Aligarh or as a matter of fact the prosecuting staff in the State of Uttar Pradesh is certainly such an identifiable group or collection of persons. This group of persons would be covered by Explanation II and could, therefore, be the subject of defamation. In Tek Chand Gupta v. R.K. Karanjla and others, 1969 Cri. L. J. 536 there was a publication in Blitz, a Hindi Weekly of Bombay, harming the reputation of the RashtriyaSwayamSevakSangh, the members of which are spread all over the country. Tek Chand, one of the members of this Sangh filed a complaint. It was held that the R.S. S. is a definite and identifiable class or body within the meaning of Explanation II to S. 499 and that a complaint by a member under S. 500 as to the alleged scandalous remark about the Sangh was maintainable. The test laid down for attracting Explanation II to S. 499 is that the class or association of persons must not be unidentifiable.
6. The DravidaKazhagam is an identifiable group. The complainant is a member of this Kazhagam. He was the Chairman of the Reception Committee in the conference. He is an active member of the DravidaKazhagam. He was one of those who piloted and sponsored the resolution. Certainly he is a person aggrieved within the meaning of S. 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The complaint by him is competent.
7. This is the only ground on which the petitioners seek to quash the charge. The petitions are dismissed.