MRTPC versus satellite TV channels,
versus cable operators, versus
consumers
i
Without regulation in place, the MRTPC`s efforts to restrict
satellite TV channels from increasingly their subscription rates arbitrarily
will get nowhere.
The
problem with governments and broadcast policy is that the former always talks
about the latter but never gets around to implementing it. There are many
pressing reasons why there ought to be a broadcast policy in lace but none more
compelling that this: regulation is in the interest of the industry as well as
the public interest. But are governments governed by the public interest?
A
very recent case, illustrates the point without answering it. Last week, the
MRTPC Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practises Commission) filed a case
against private and satellite TV channels on the grounds that they were
arbitrarily increasing their pay channel subscriptions whenever they liked and
this was against the public interest.
Most
consumers would tend to applaud the move by MRTPC. Most consumers have been
confronted by inflated cable TV bills and the cable operators` say it is the
fault of TV channels who hike subscription rates. Take it or leave it. But it
isn`t quite as simple as that. You cannot leave it: try getting your cable
operator to remove a pay channel which you do not wish to subscribe to. He or
she will tell you that in the present circumstances, that is impossible.
Subscribers
argue _ and quite rightly too _ that if they do not watch particular pay
channels why on earth should they pay for them or the increases in subscription
rates for them? Why, indeed? Also, how can the TV channel simply increase the
subscription rate whenever it pleases?
Cable operators, particularly independent ones, are likely to give MRTPC`s move
a slow handclap. Slow on account of their belief that the MRTPC case will get
no where.
Slow
because they are wedged between the consumer and the TV channels and are being
squeezed at both ends. Consumers who refuse to pay for pay TV channels continue
to receive those channels because the cable operator is reluctant to cut their
connections (which, presently, is the only way to deal with a consumer`s
non-cooperation) since a rival cable operator will then take over their
customer at competitive subscription rates. Meanwhile, the TV channels demand
payment from the cable operator and if they do not pay, the TV channels
threaten to withdraw their business from the cable operator and transfer it to
a competing operator.
The
TV channels have their own justification for the subscription increases:
broadly speaking it rests on two counts: first, they have to constantly upgrade
transmission quality (an argument cable operators use too) and second, they
believe cable operators under-estimate the numbers of their subscribers
deliberately to pay less to the TV channels. Rival cable organisations,
belonging or linked to rival TV organisations, in particular play such games.
Basically,
what you have here is a case of three rights adding up to one wrong. The
consumer, the cable operator and the TV channels, each have a justified
complaint. But does righteousness brings joy? Consumer, cable operators and TV
channels would agree that the only way to
fairly arbitrate the case is to introduce conditional access systems: this
technology allows consumers to receive only those TV channels they wish to.It
would also settle the dispute over numbers: the conditional access system would
indicate just how many subscribers are s