Managing the media at SAARC
From Shubha Singh recently in Islamabad
In these days of round-the-clock live news coverage through television, internet and the news wires, the media has become a significant player in public diplomacy, especially in high profile summits and conferences. Instant analysis laced with unverified information and conjecture creates its own pressure by generating an early public reaction to evolving diplomatic negotiations.
The Agra summit in 2001 between Pakistan President Gen Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee failed to produce any results. The failure was blamed partly on the high-voltage media focus, which it was claimed had left little room to manoeuvre for the participants. But the Indian government was to blame for its abysmal handling of the media. The media barred from the venue of the meeting had practically no authentic information of the meetings that had taken place and no Indian Minister or senior official was available to answer media queries. Despite going back empty handed after a meeting that he had fervently asked for, Gen Musharraf could claim a victory of sorts because he managed to get the last word through a televised breakfast meeting with prominent Indian editors.
Two and half years later, Indian media managers had learnt some lessons from the Agra fiasco and had a well thought out strategy in place for the Islamabad summit. The method used was an effective management of expectations -- expectations, which have a tendency to run riot through a frenetic build up that ends up making the event itself seem like an anticlimax. There was no build up on the bilateral summit, so the expectations were kept in check and information about various events was available without much delay.
The Indian government had its media management strategy firmly in hand from the time it decided to organise two chartered flights for over 300 journalists to Islamabad. Each individual journalist or the organisation he or she represented paid about Rs 16,100 for the facility provided by the Ministry of External Affairs. It was one of the biggest Indian media contingents to travel abroad to cover an event and included a wide cross section of Indian media from small and large publications across the country.
There was ample evidence of the importance being accorded to the event. Over 250 invitations sent to media organisations across the country should have been an indicator that some major news was in the making. But the Indian government set a tight lease on expectations by refusing to talk about the possibility of a bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf. It however set a positive trend for the atmospherics surrounding Islamabad tour by proposing dates for technical level talks on the opening of new routes between the two neighbours on the eve of the summit.
The lesson from the Agra summit had shown that lack of information led to all manner of speculation about what had transpired in the meetings. In Islamabad, journalists could not complain about inadequate information. There was no dearth of press briefings; External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha promptly turned up after every important meeting to talk to the media. He succinctly gave a read-out on the day`s events, answered questions on the subject and refused to be drawn into other issues. On the last day of the SAARC summit, after the concluding ceremony, the External Affairs Minister was ready with the joint press statement even before journalists reached the media centre. Yashwant Sinha had to wait for media persons to arrive as journalists jammed the lifts and the staircase in the rush to get to the briefing. National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra was present at one press conference to deny the reports of his meeting the Pakistani ISI chief.
Before the bilateral meeting took place, Yashwant Sinha was forthcoming with news in his interaction with the media, but kept the focus on firmly on Saarc related issues. Though the India-Pakistan meeting was the exciting story for the assembled journalists, it did not become the sole news to come out of Islamabad. On January 2, Sinha talked about the Indian proposals at Saarc meetings, including the possibility of an Economic Union in the region. The next day, just after the meeting of the SAARC Foreign Ministers, Sinha announced the decision approving the South Asian Free Trade Agreement. The story on January 4 was the inauguration of the summit and the speeches made by the leaders of the seven member countries.
After the inaugural ceremony, Mr Vajpayee called on his Pakistani counterpart, Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali and Yashwant Sinha met Pakistani Foreign Minister Khalid Mahmud Kasuri. Keeping the demands of television in mind, the Indian side did not wait till the evening to give a round up of the day`s events. Mr Yashwant Sinha promptly reached the media centre and briefed the press on the two meetings, announced that the Prime Minister was to make a courtesy call on President Musharraf, answered a couple of questions and left for his next appointment. The Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman gave roughly the same information during his evening press briefing.
After the much-awaited bilateral summit, Yashwant Sinha again held a short media conference to announce that the meeting, still categorised as a courtesy call lasted a little over an hour. The terse announcement kept undue speculation at bay and the negotiations over the joint press statement were kept under wraps. When the contents of the joint press statement were released the next day, it came as a surprise. At Agra, the Information Minister Sushma Swaraj`s remark reiterating India`s position on the Kashmir issue became the focus of Pakistani ire. It was said to have vitiated the atmosphere leading to the eventual failure of the summit. Pakistani Information Minister Sheikh Rashid told a Pakistani news channel that another meeting between the two leaders was likely and a joint declaration was on the way. It was an untimely comment that was beginning to spark off a good deal of conjecture. The Indian officials denied any such meeting was scheduled. Finally, the Pakistani spokesperson dismissed talk of a second meeting in his evening briefing and the speculation over the ill-timed remark died down.
The physical arrangements of a media centre with adequate news transmission facilities is an aid to journalists in their work, but of even greater importance is the ready availability and access to information. Negotiations necessarily need to be kept confidential while they are underway, but absence of information is counterproductive. The Ministry of External Affairs has traditionally released information at its own convenience, but 24-hour news service has changed the rules of the game. The Ministry seems to have learnt an important lesson from Agra, that limited information from an authoritative source is better than delayed information. The media management at Islamabad was successful because it paid attention to this fact.